This ‘inner worth’ is also called here “dignity” (Fey: 1319).
This ‘inner worth’ is also called here “dignity” (Fey: 1319).Thus, when it comes to be an end in itself, the relevant rationality is rationality and thus autonomy.This sentence is: “For nothing has a value except that which the law determines for it” (436,1); let us dub it the Before we provide an interpretation and defense of Kant’s ground-thesis against the revisionist reading, let us look at some key terms related to it.Tags: Homework EssaysGood Signposting In EssaysEssay Topics For Research PaperCounseling Graduate Entrance EssayWrite An Essay On Training And DevelopmentEssays On Virginia Woolf'S A Room Of One'S OwnEssay On Diabetes
The following places seem unambiguous: “ is thus the ground of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature” (436,6); and: “the dignity of humanity consists precisely in this capacity for universal legislation, although with the proviso that it is at the same time itself subject to this legislation” (440,10); or: “the will of one rational being must always at the same time be regarded as universally condition in order to be a member in the realm of ends: “Such a realm of ends would actually be brought about through maxims, the rule of which is prescribed by the categorical imperatives of all rational beings, One can have dignity as a king, a teacher, a mathematician, and so on.
We do not dispute this, of course; we do not mean to say that in all possible contexts ‘dignity’ means the same as ‘absolute inner value’.
The importance of this idea of the noumenally-good will is well established by a considerable number of passages.
is the will that finite beings have when their volition is indeed moral; it is the noumenally-good will considered as a will that manifests itself successfully in a finite being against the influence of inclinations and desires.
In this paper, we shall provide answers to these questions with regard to Kant’s .
Sensen raises a very interesting question: Do humans beings have dignity because or inasmuch as we must respect them, or do they have dignity on the basis of a worth they already possess?At first sight, seems fairly easy to understand: It is “the property of the will through which it is a law to itself” (440,16).However, Kant’s distinction between the world of understanding and the world of sense as well as, accordingly, his distinction between a noumenally-good will and a practically-good will, complicate this ‘property of the will’ considerably.For Kant uses the term ‘autonomy’ not only for the human being and its capacity for a practically-good will, but also for the property of the noumenally-good will, just considered by duty, then we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of understanding” (453,14, o.e.).Thus the free will is the noumenal will, and autonomy is its property; and in some contexts, this will is The concept of ‘autonomy’ is strongly related to the concepts of ‘end in itself’ and ‘rational nature’, and yet it in GMS II Kant says very little about what exactly an ‘end in itself’ is and what ‘rational nature’ means., Kant famously distinguishes between animality, humanity, and personality, and it has been a recurring misinterpretation to ascribe to Kant the position that humanity as the ability to set ends is what deserves respect.The purpose of this part is not to offer a detailed interpretation (let alone a systematic defense) of Kant’s ground-thesis and the literature on it; rather, we shall outline such an interpretation arguing that this will suffice to demonstrate that the burden of proof is on the revisionist reading and that it cannot account for Kant’s ground-thesis (2).There is one sentence in GMS II, however, that does seem to support the revisionist reading.Here, in our context, when we speak of dignity we mean the dignity of a being it has due to its autonomy, and we have seen already that it is strongly related to other terms such as ‘end in itself’, ‘nouemenal will’, ‘autonomy’, and so on.To prepare our interpretation of Kant’s ground-thesis, let us now look at dignity more specifically.These terms, in turn, are related to the term ‘dignity’, because autonomous beings are ends in themselves; and since ends in themselves have dignity, autonomous beings have dignity.But is it really the noumenal (‘autonomous’) will that grounds dignity?